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This paper is  part of research on trade policy and industrial  efficiency
at the World Bank.  An appendix describing the model is available from
the  authors  upon  request.  We  thank  Tom Rutherford,  Glen  Harrison,
Shantayan  Devarajan,  and  Susan  Vromann for  helpful  comments,  and
Ghislaine Bayard, Alex Pfaff, and Rebecca Sugui for excellent logistic
support.1.  Introduction
Recent  empirical  work,  which  has  adjusted  for  sex,  age,  full  time
work,  fringe  benefits  and  other  available  worker  characteristics,  has  estimated
inter-industry  wage differences  in the  United  States  (US). The  conclusion  is
that  it  is difficult  to account  for  remaining  persistent  inter-industry  wage
differentials  on the  basis  of unobserved  differences  in  ability  or  equalizing
differences  such  as  attractiveness  of the  work.  Rather,  it  appears  that
workers  in  a  number  of industries  earn  rents  (Krueger  and  Summers,  1988;  Katz
and  Summers,  1989b). These  wage  differentials  are  often  explained  on the  basis
of "efficiency'  wage theories,l/  and,  in the  cases  more relevant  to this  paper,
on the  basis  of union  extraction  of rents. Since  firms  presumably  employ
workers  up to the  point  where  the  value  of the  workers'  marginal  product  equals
the  industry  wage,  these  data  imply  that  the  value  of the  marginal  product  of
workers  in  wage  premia  industries  exceeds  the  value  of the  marginal  product  of
workers  in  industries  without  wage  premia. It follows  that  labor  is
misallocated  in the  economy,  with too  little  labor  employed  in sectors  that  pay
wage  premia.
Some  authors  (e.g.,  Katz  and  Summers,  1989a,  1989b)  contend  that  these
factors  form  the  basis  for  a theory  of industrial  policy  which  is  more relevant
empirically  than  product  market  imperfections  along  the  lines  pioneered  by
Brander  and  Spencer  (1983,  1984),  i.e.,  there  is  little  opportunity  for
international  profit-shifting  compared  with situations  where  industri&l  policy
can  reallocate  labor  efficiently.2/  The  argument  is that,  given  the  existence
of  wage  distortions,  we are  in  a second  best  world  where  the  provision  of an
export  sul'3idy  or import  tariff  to  a  wage premia  sector  may  be socially
beneficial  if the  conventional  production  and  consumption  distortion  costs  oftariffs  or subsidies  are  outweighed  by the  reduction  of labor  misallocation
costs. To date,  however,  the  argument  has  not  been subjected  to any  empirical
test.
Two  industries  where  wage premia  are  among  the  highest  and  which  have
recently  received  import  protection  are  autos  and  steel. In addition  to  the
existence  of  wage  premia  and  protection,  these  Industries  were chosen  because
of the  existence  of significant  increasing  returns  to  scale  which  implies  that
market  structure  issues  may  also  be relevant  to the  conclusion. In this  paper
we investigate  systematically  the  empirical  validity  of the  wage distortion
argument  as a basis  for  protection  with  a general  equilibrium  model  of the  US
economy  in  these  industries.  The  model  is  calibrated  to 1984,  a year  in  which
VERs  on Japanese  auto  imports  were  binding  and  VERs  on steel  imports  had  just
been  negotiated.  We estimate  the  costs  of protection  in autos  and  steel  with
and  without  wage  premia  under  three  different  market  structures:  constant
returns  to scale  (CRTS)  and  perfect  competition;  increasing  returns  to  scale
(IRTS)  and  contestable  markets;  and  IRTS  and  monopolistic  competition.
We show  that  if the  wage premia  are  exogenous,  the  costs  of protection
are  less  than  if there  were  no premia,  but  not  significantly  so.  Under  all
market  structures,  the  benefits  of superior  labor  reallocation  are  far  too
small  to  justify  the  protection  provided. However,  we argue  that  wage
distortions  in autos  and  steel  are  more reasonably  modelled  as  the result  of
union  exploitation  of  monopoly  power  and  therefore  should  be endogenous  where
the  union  has  a tradeoff  between  employment  and  the  wage  premium. With
endogenous  wage  premia,  the  imposition  of protection  will increase  the  wage
distortion.  This reduces  the  second  best  effect  of labor  misallocation,  so  the
costs  of protection  are  closer  to the  case  of no  wage  premia.3/ Moreover,  if
the  union  values  the  wage  premium  sufficiently  highly  relative  to an increasein  employment,  the  costs  of  protection  may  be greater  than  in  the  case  with  no
wage distortions.
This  latter  result  bears  resemblance  to  the  discussion  by Eaton  and
Grossman  (1986)  who  argue  that  one  must  be cautious  in  using  profit-shifting  as
a basis  for  industrial  policy  because  the  existence  of profits  could  be the
basis  for  taxing  rather  than  subsidizing  an industry. The  appropriate  policy
depends  on  how firms  formulate  expectations,  something  about  which  policy-
makers  have  little  information.  In a similar  vein,  we find  that  wage premia
may  result  in  higher  costs  of  protection  depending  on the  union's  valuation  of
wages  versus  employment.  More strikingly,  we show  that  the "optimal'  wage
policy  is  a tax  under  IRTS  and  a  market  sttucture  which  allows  for  firm  entry
and  exit. In sum,  we show  that  once  one  recognizes  the  endogeneity  of  wage
distortions,  it  becomes  difficult  to determine  appropriate  industrial  policy  on
their  basis  and  extra  caution  must  be exercised  under  IRTS.
In  terms  of  modelling  innovation,  this  paper  is the  first  to  model
endogenous  union-induced  labor  market  distortions  in  applied  general
equilibrium.  It is  also  the  first  to investigate  systematically  the  impact  of
labor  market  distortions  under  different  market  structure  assumptions.  Also in
line  with  our focus  on the  labor  market  and  the  interaction  of employment  and
wage  distortions,  we incorporate  labor-leisure  choice  in a  more satisfactory
manner  than  previously.
The  remainder  of the  paper  is  organized  as follows. In section  2,  we
describe  how  we model labor  market  distortions  with and  without  labor  union
activity. We also  describe  how  we model  economies  of scale  and  how  we
represent  pticing  practices. Section  3  describes  the  data  and  benchmarking  for
the  counterfactual  simulations  arnd  reports  on  the  welfare  costs  of VERs  under
CRTS  and  no wage  distortions.  Section  4 evaluated  the  distortionary  costs  of-4  -
protection  created  by the  VERb  both  with  and  without  labor  market  distortions
and,  with  and  without  imperfectly  competitive  behavior. This  step-by-step
approach  helps  isolate  the  contribution  of each  distortionary  component.
Section  5 asks  what  would  be the  likely  benefits  of optimal  wage and  tariff
policies  in  the  auto  and  steel  industries.  Conclusions  follow  in section  6.
2.  Modelling  Labor  and  Product  Markets  in  Autos  and  Steel
The  auto  and  steel  sectors  are  among  the  sectors  taat  pay  the  highest
wages  in  US  manufazturing.  Steel  worker  (auto  worker)  compensation  was 63 (53)
percent  above  the  compensation  of the  average  US  manufacturing  worker  in
1984.4/ Using  the  1984  Current  Population  Survey,  Krueger  and  Summers  (1988)
estimate  that,  after  controlling  for  human  capital  and  demographic  factors
such  as sex,  age,  race,  marital  state  and  education,  workers  in the  t-ansport
equipment  sector  earn  a  premium  of 27  percent  above  the  industrywide  average,
and  workers  of fabricated  metal  a  premium  of 26 percent. They  also  find  that
these  statistically  significant  premia  are  stable  across  time  and space. These
wage  premia  are  viewed  as too  large  and  persistent  to be explained  by
compensating  differentials  such  as  attractiveness  of  work.  Similar  results
were found  by  Katz  and  Summers  (1989b).
In  view  of this (and  other)  evidence,  we assume  that  workers  in auto
and  steel  earn  a  premium. We  model  this  premium  in  two  different  ways.  In one
variant,  we assume  that  the  premium  is  exogenous  ti  >  1,  i.e.  Wi  - W#i,  where  W
is  the  wage earned  in sectors  where  workers  do  not receive  rents. Workers  in
all  industries  receive  the  value  of their  marginal  product  at the  wage rate
Woi.  Since  ti  >  1  is  a premium,  we choose  0  - 1 for  all sectors  other  thanautos  and  steel.5/ This  places  us in  a typical  second-best  situation  since  the
benefits  of removing  protection  in  autos  and  steel  must  now  be balanced  against
the  costs  of taking  labor  out  of these  sectors  where  the  value  of the  marginal
product  of labor  is relatively  high.
In  the  other  variant,  we model  the  determination  of the  wage  premium.
Katz  and  Summers  (1989a)  have  noted  that  steel  and  autos  are  an exception  to
the  pattern  of high  wage industries  in  that  exports  are  not significant  and
that  the  high  wages  do  not  appear  to  be explained  by efficiency  wage theories.
Rather,  strong  union  behavior  appears  to explain  the  high  wages. In this  set-
up,  unions  are  viewed  as an instrument  of  employees  to generate  (or  extract)
monopoly  rents. These  rents  can  exist  due  to regulation  or imperfections  in
the  product  market. If  the  union  can  organize  a sufficiently  large  percentage
of  workers  in  the  industry,  it  can  then  restrict  labor  supply  and  collect  these
rents  in  classic  monopoly  fashion. When the  ccnditions  which  lead  to the
generation  of the  rents  change,  the  premium  earned  b)  .rkers  will change.
Hence  the  premium  earned  by  workers  is endogenous  with respect  to a change  in
protection.6/
In this  variant,  we assume  that  the  union  either  unilaterally  sets  the
wage rate  or  negotiates  it  with the  firm,  but  that  the  firm  unilaterally
determines  the  level  of employment.  It is  well  known  (see  McDonald  and  Solow,
1981)  that  allowing  unilateral  determination  of the  employment  level  by the
firm  results  in  outcomes  off  the  union-firm  contract  curve  in  wage-employment
space. We choose  our  assumption,  however,  because  the  evidence  indicates  that
firms  and  unions  are  not on their  contract  curve  (Farber,  1986).7/
The  union's  utility  function  is  given  by (sector  subscripts  for  autos
and  steel  dropped):-6-
(1)  U  *  w[  -W]7tL-L];A,  7,  6  >  0
where  W is the  wage rate  in  the  competitive  labor  market  (i.e.,  in  other
sectors) 7, 6  are  parameters  determining  the  weights  attached  to  wages  and
employment,  and  U0, Lo  are  the  minimum  acceptable  levels  of the  wage rate  and
employment.  The  formulation  follows  Farber  (1986).8/ It is  natural  to take  WQ
- W.  For  the  CES  technology for  value-added assumed  here,  labor demand,  Ld,
is  given  by:
(2)  Li  (a  j  (X  i)  l-o
where  A is a  constant,  PVC  is  primary  variable  cost,  a  is  the  elasticity  of
substitution  between  capital  and  labor,  a  is a quasi-share  parameter  for  labor
from  the  CES  value-added  funccion,  and  X is  output. The  union  maximizes  (1)
subject  to (2),  yielding  the  following  expression  for  the  endogenous  wage
differential:
Ld
(3)  #__  =(  Ld  &
Thus,  since  labor  is  a derived  demand,  the  wage differential  will  be affected
by changes  in  trade  policy.
In  this  formulation,  high (low)  values  for  7  combined  with low  (high)
values  for  6  correspond  to  cases  where  the  union  puts  a high (low)  weight  on
wages (employment).  The  evidence  suggests  that  union  behavior  departs  from  the
special  cases  of rent  maximization  or  wage bill  maximization  (see  Farber,  1986
for  a survey). Hence,  we shall  vary  systematically  the  weights  of the  union's
objective  function  to  account  for  a -ange  of  plausible  behavior.*  -~~~~~~~~~~~~~7-
By assuming  a  passive  firm,  we may  be attributing  the  im.ict  of a  non-
passive  firm (which  would  lower  the  wage  and  increase  employment)  to union
preferences  for  more employment.  For  labor  econowists  interested  in  explaining
union  behavior,  the  distinction  between  an active  and  a passive  firm  is
crucial.  but  for  our  objective  of approximating  wage  and  employment  levels  in
the  steel  and  auto  industries  in  response  to  a change  in trade  policy,  this
simplification  is a  natural  one. This  is  because  increasing  tCe  weight  on
employment  in (1)  is  equivalent  in  terms  of  the  wage-employment  outcome  to the
firm  non-passively  influencing  the  wage decision  with a lower  employment
weight. What is  crucial  for  the  debate  on trade  and  industrial  policy  is that
this  formulation  allows  for  trade  policy  to influence  the  degree  of distortion
in the  labor  market. As an example,  consider  a  decrease  in the  level  of
protection  in the  auto  industry. This  will  induce  an inward  shift  in the
demand  curve  for  labor  as  consumers  shift  towards  imported  autos. This  inward
shift,  in turn,  will induce  the  union  to set  a lower  wage (i.e.,  to choose  a
lower  0).
Economywide  labor  supply  is  endogenous  s 4nce  the  representative
consumer-worker  maximizes  the  extended  nested  Stone-Geary  utility  function:
n
(4)  'W =  I  (C~  i
i-o
n
where  E  Pi  - 1,  Pi >  0,  (Ci  - Xi)  >  0,  CO  is  leisure, i =  1,..., n is an
i-O
index  over  composite  commodities.  Utility  maximization  takes  place  in two
stages. In the  first  stage,  as in  Abbott  and  Ashenfelter  (1976),  maximization
of (4)  subject  to "full  income"  yields  the  labor  supply  equation:n
(5)  LS  - MAXHOURS - (po/  W) (Y  - E  Pi)i)  / (1  - po)
where  Y is income,  W is  the  wage rate,  -MAXHOURS  is  a parameter  denoting  the
maximum  workforce,  and  Pi and  Xi  may  be interpreted  as the  price  and  minimum
subsistence  of the  composite  good  of sector  i, respectively.  In the  second
stage,  the  consumer  maximizes  compor;te  consumption  Ci subject  to income
allocated  to consumption  of goods  in sector  i.  This  formulation  of the  utility
function  allows  us  to calibrate  labor  supply  and  commodity  price
elasticities.9/  Based  on  a review  of the  econometric  evidence,  we calibrate
(5)  to  an elasticity  of supply  of labor  to income  of -0.12  and  an elasticity  of
labor  supply  to the  real  wage of 0.055.10/
The  main  focus  of this  paper  is on the  costs  of trade  restrictions  in
the  presence  of labor  market  distortions.  Therefore,  we consider  first  the
effects  of the  costs  of protection  in both  sectors  under  the  assumption  of
perfect  competition  and  a CRTS  technology.  However,  there  is evidence  of
unexploited  economies  of scale  in  both  sectors.ll/  Hence  the  alternative  of an
IRTS  technology  and  the  need  to  decide  on the  appropriate  pricing  rule.
For  pricing,  we assume  that  US steel  and  auto  firms  price
competitively  in export  markets  because  thev  Face  close  substitutes  from  stiff
foreign  competition.  The  assumption  is  plausible  and,  in any  case,  of little
consequence  for  both industries  where  exports  do not  exceed  5  percent  of total
sales.
With respect  to domestic  sales,  the  evidence  in  steel  strongly
suggests  the  absence  of  monopolistic  pricing  practices  in the  last  25  years
(see,  e.g.,  Scherer  (1980),  Tarr (1990),  US Federal  Trade  Commission  (1977),
Rippe  (1970),  or  Hancke  (1968)). Hence  we assume  an analogue  to  marginal  cost. *  - 9-
pricing  under  CRTS,  namely  contestable  market  pricing. Under  this  assumption,
threat  of  entry  (because  of ease  of entry)  forces  firms  to price  at  average
cost.
For  autos,  a  model  with imperfectly  competitive  pricing  may  be more
appropriate.  For  example,  Dixit  (1988)  calibrates  conjectures  and  finds
evidence  that  the  auto  industry  prices  between  competition  and  Cournot.
Therefore,  for  autos  we contrast  contestable  market  pricing  with  the
alternative  of  monopolistic  competition  with calibrated  conjectures  and  free
entr,. Denote  then  by ed the  market  elasticity  of  demand  of the  domestic
variety  for  autos  with respect  to the  domestic  price  (an  endogenous  variable
that  depends  on elasticities  and  shares  of ail  sectors--see  de  Melo  and  Tarr
(1990b).  Then,  in equilibrium,  the  price  PDi  charged  by each  firm  i for
domescic  sales  is given  by:
PDi  - MCi
(6)-
PDi  Ned
where  N is  the  number  of  domestic  firms  and i  is  the  output  conjecture  of the
i-th  firm,  i.e.  the  amount  by  which  the  i-th  firm  assumes  industry  output
will change  in  response  to a small  unit  change  in its  own  output. Equation
(6)  defines  the  percentage  mark-up over  marginal costs  in  terms  of  N,  ed
and  ~.12/ It  can  be rewritten  to state  that each  (symmetric)  firm  sets
marginal  revenue  equal  to  marginal  costs MCi.  Given  an  initial  value of N
and  ed, i  is  calibrated  from  (6). The  values  of Ed  and  I  appear  in  table  1
along  with other  relevant  information  on the  auto  and  steel  sectors. Like
Dixit,  we find  conjectures  more competitive  than  Cournct.13/ In the
simulations,  the  value  of  N is  endogenously  determined  so  that  the  long-run
zero  profit  condition  is  maintained  by entry/exst.-10  -
Table 1
Distortions, Production, Demand Structure, and Elasticities
in the  Auto and Steel Industries
Autos  Steel
Distortions
Wage Premium (0)  27.0  26.0
Premium Rate or,  Intports  31.8  7.0 b/
Production  and Demand a/
Gross Output  124.2  57.5
Employment (1,000  man-years)  536.5  531.0
Domestic Final Demand Sales  111.0  0.0
Intermediate  Sales  8.3  56.1
Exports  4.9  1.4
Imports
Intermediates  2.3  12.7
Final Demand  30.3  0.0
Elasticities and Parameters c/
Capital-Labor Substitution  0.8  1.0
Import-Domestic  Substitution Elasticity d/  1.9  3.0
Composite Final Demand  0.8  n.a.
Export-Domestic  Transformation  Elasticity d/  2.9  2.9
Calibrated  Conjecture (D)  0.72  n.a.
Derived Elasticity of Demand (Ed)  1.37  n.a.
Cost Disadvantage  Ratio (CDR)  0.11  0.04
Notes:  n.a. - not applicable.
a/  1984 US $ billion.
b/  Premium rate resulting from rationing steel  to 85 percent of the volume
of steel imports in 1984.
c/  The sources for demand and supply  price elasticities  are detailed in de
Melo and Tarr (199Ob).
d/  The selected  CES (CET)  functions imply that the corresponding
substitution (transformation)  elasticities  are compensated import
demand (export supply)  price elasticities.*~~~~~~~~~~  l  -1-
We assume  perfect  substitution  across  for  all  firms'  products  within  a
sector. To avoid  specialization  that  would  occur  in response  to  changes  in
trade  policy  if  domestic  and foreign  goods  were  perfect  substitutes,  we assume
national  production  differentiation  at  the  sector  level. Foreign  produced
goods  are  imperfect  substitutes  for  domestically  produced  goods,  and  goods  sold
abroad  are  imperfect  substitutes  with  goods  sold  on the  domestic  market.
(Constant  elasticities  of substitution  and  transformation,  respectively.)14/
This  assumption  implies  that  we do  not  model  variety  so  that  entry  results  in
market  fragmentation.  But,  as suggested  by  Dixit  and  Stiglitz  (1977),
increased  product  variety  raises  welfare. Thus,  firm  exit  (the  mechanism  by
which  zero  profit  is  achieved  under  monopolistic  competition)  may overstate  the
benefits  of removing  protection  unless  additional  import  varieties  are
obtained.
The  remaining  features  of the  model  are  standard  to computable  general
equilibrium  (CGE)  models. The  model  includes  two  factors,  capital  and labor
which  are  mobile  between  sectors. Total  capital  is in  fixed  supply. Domestic
demand  includes  two  components,  final  and  intermediates.  The  government
sector's  role  is limited  to lump-sum  redistributions  to and  from  the
representative  consumer. In  the  simulations  reported  below,  the  static  CGE
model  is  disaggregated  into  10 sectors,  among  which  are  autos  and  steel. The
model  is  calibrated  to 1984,  a year  when  the  VER  on Japanese  autos  was
particularly  binding  and  the  year  in  which  the  US Trade  Representative
negotiated  VERs  with foreign  governments  with the  stated  objective  of inducing
a reduction  in  the imports  of carbon  and  alloy  steel  products  to 18.5  percent
of domestic  apparent  consumption  down  from  the  26.4  percent  level  of 1984. In
practice  the  VERs  in steel  were  not so  binding,  so  we assume  they  induced  a 15
percent  reduction  in imports  rather  than  the  30 percent  reduction  intended  by-12  -
the  negotiations.  All simulations  maintain  tariffs  at their  existing  level  in
1984  (an  economywide  average  of 3.5  percent)  as  well as  quotas  in textiles  and
apparel  negotiated  under  the  Multi-Fiber  Agreement  (MFA).
3.  Costs  of  ViRs  Under  CRTS  and  No  Wage  Distortions
We start  with a "traditional"  welfare  cost  calculation  of  VERs in
autos  and  steel. We assume  perfect  competition  with a  CRTS  technology  and  a
labor  market  where  the  auto  and  steel  sectors  do  not  pay  a  wage  premium. We
decompose  the  costs  of  protection  into  distortionary  and  rent  components  and
check  the  sensitivity  of results  to the  specification  of labor  supply. When  we
introduce  product  and  labor  market  "imperfections"  in section  4,  we shall
concentrate  mostly  on the  evaluation  of the  distortionary  cost  component.
Also,  in section  4, all  results  will refer  to the  specification  with endogenous
labor  supply.
Table  1  describes  the  structure  of the  auto  and  steel  industries  and
the  estimated  distortions  in  both  sectors. The  source  of the  wage  premia  have
been  discussed  above. The  estimated  premium  rate  on  auto  imports  for  1984  is
estimated  at 31.8  percent. As discussed  in de  Melo  and  Tarr (1990a),  this  rate
combines  the  estimates  by  Feenstra  (1988)  (for  Japanese  premia)  and  Dinopoulos
and  Kreinin  (1988)  (for  European  premia). Both  studies  have  used  hedonic
regressions  to adjust  for  quality  changes  induced  by the  VER.  The  premia  go
predominantly  to foreigners,  in  this  case  Japanese  and  European  auto
producers.15/  Simulating  the  costs  of the  VER  on Japanese  auto imports  can
therefore  be decomposed  into  two  components:  a rent  component  that  would  arise
if the  US  were to  capture  premia;  and  a distortionary  cost  component  arising
from  the  wedge  created  by the  premium. For  steel,  the  costs  of protection  also-13  -
has  the  same  two  components,  but  the  simulation  is obtained  by solving  the
model  for  a restriction  in  the  quantity  of steel  imports  which  yields  a  premium
rate  of 7  percent  on steel  imports.16/  Hence,  there  is  asymmetry  in the  way
the  costs  of protection  are  simulated  in  each sector. For  simplicity,  we
report  all  welfare  estimates  (given  by the  Hicksian  equivalent  variation
measure)  as positive  numbers.
Apart  from  these  distortionary  measures,  table  1 gives  information  on
the  production  and  demand  structures  in  both  sectors. Both  sectors  exported  a
very small  share  of total  production  and  faced  stiff  competition  from  imports
in 1984,  at least  as  measured  by import  penetration  ratios. Gross  output  of
steel  was about  half  that  of  autos  and  is  the  more labor-intensive  of  the  two
sectors. Elasticities  of substitution  in  demand  (between  imports  and  domestic)
are  higher  in steel  than  in autos,  reflecting  the  characteristics  of  a more
homogenous  product.
Welfare  and  employment  effects  of the  VERs  are  given  in table  2.  To
maintain  symmetry  in the  table,  we present  all  results  as if  VERs  are  imposed
in  both  sectors. The  welfare  cost  of  VERs  on autos  is  higher  than  on steel,
because  the  import  value  of autos  is  about  2.5  times  higher  than  the  import
value  of steel  products,  and  autos  is  the  more  distorted  of the  two  sectors
with a premium  rate  about  4.5  times  that  of steel.17/
The  welfare  costs  of  protection  are  almost  identical  between  fixed  and
variable  labor  supply. However,  variable  labor  supply  would  affect  welfare
results  in simulations  imposing  a tax  on  wages  (see  Ballard  et al.  1985,
chapter  10). The  change  in  employment  in autos,  however,  does  differ  slightly
between  fixed  and  endogenous  total  labor  supply. Removing  protection  in autos
results  in increased  income,  which  reduces  aggregate  labor  supply  and  the- 14 -
Table 2
Welfare Costs of Imposing VERs in Autos and Steel:
CRTS and No Wage Premia
(in  billions of 1984 dollars)
Fixed Total  Endogenous Total
Labor Supply  Labor Supply
Autos  Steel  Autos  Steel
Rent Capture a/  7.877  0.736  7.867  0.736
Distortionary Costs a/  1.939  0.128  1.998  0.128
Total Costs a/  9.816  0.864  9.815  0.864
Employment Change b/  36.22  20.80  36.24  20.80
Notes:
a/  Welfare costs given by the equivalent  variation (EV)  measure.
bl  Change in employment it the sector in thousand  work-years.- 15 -
reduction  is  distributed  across  all sectors  including  autos. Given  our  focus
on the  labor  market  effects  of protection,  all  remaining  simulations  assume  an
endogenous  total  labor  supply. Also,  most  of our  discussion  will focus  on the
distortionary  cost  component  of  VERs.
4.  Distortionary  Costs  of Protection  vith  Labor  and
Product  Market  Imperfections
We now come  to the  central  issue: are  labor  market  imperfections
sufficient  to affect  significantly  the  distortionary  cost  estimates  reported
above? We contrast  the  estimated  value  of the  distortionary  cost  in two
dimensions.  First,  under  the  assumption  of  CRTS,  we compute  distortionary
costs  under  the  assumption  of an  exogenous  wage  premium,  then  under  the
assumption  of  an endogenously  determined  wage  premium  affected  by union
activity. Because  of uncertainty  about  the  relative  weight  unions  attach  to
wages  and  employment,  we report  results  for  three  combinations  of  weights  to
wages  and  employment  in  the  utility  function: low  weight  on wages  (7  - 0.2,  6
=  0.8);  medium  (7  - 6  - 0.5);  high  weight  on  wages (7  =  0.8;  6  =  0.2). Second,
we examine  the  sensitivity  of these  results  on labor  market  imperfections  to
assumptions  about  market  structure.  Results  for  steel  appear  in table  3;
results  for  autos  in  table  4.
Steel. Start  with  CRTS. The  distortionary  costs  of rationing  steel
when the  steel  sector  pays  an exogenous  wage  premium  of 26 percent  is  only
about  one-fourth  of the  cost  when there  is  no  wage premium. This  derives  from
the  second  best  effect  of superior  reallocation  of labor. Given  the  high rent
transfer  component  of VERs,  however,  the  total  costs  are  reduced  by only  11
percent. The  distortionary  cost  estimate  reflects  the  potential  lower  cost  of
protection  if  an *equivalent"  tariff  (or  a quota  that  captured  rents)  were
employed  rather  than  the  VER.- 16  -
Table  8
Effects  of VERs a  Stool
(billions  of 1964  dollars)
Exogenous  ---- Endogonous  Wage  Distortion  */---
No  Wage  Wage  Union  Wage  Union  Wage  Union  Wage
Distortion Distortion  Weight  *.2  Weight  =.C  Weight  a.$
1.  Distortionary  Costs  of
VERx  k/
a.  CRTS  0.128  0.0  0.0  6  0.069  0.113
b.  Contestablo  Markets  0.038  -0.046  -0.046  -0.015  0.027
2.  Capturo  Rents  b/
a.  CRTS  0.786  0.73C  0.740  0.803  0.879
b.  Contestable  Markots  0.716  0.715  0.721  0.784  0.862
3.  Total  Costs  of  VERx  b/
a.  CRTS  0.664  0.768  0.776  0.872  0.992
b.  Contestable  Markets  0.764  0.667  0.676  0.769  0.889
4.  Wage  Distortion  In  Steel  c/
a.  CRTS  0.0  .260  .263  .293  .330
b.  Contestable  Morkots  0.0  .260  .268  .298  .3B1
5.  Change  Employment  in  Steel  d/
a.  CRTS  20.8  20.6  20.2  18.7  S.9
b.  Contestable  Markots  18.9  18.8  18.8  12.5  6.4
Notes:
All  simulations  are  with  *ndogonous  economywide  labor  supply.
*/  Weight  on  wages  is  given  by  7  and in  all  casoo  7  +  6  a  1.O.
E/  EV  mesure In  billions  of  1984  dollars. The  distortionary  cost  Is  calculated  as the  difforonce
between  the  total  costs  of  VERc  and  the  ronts.
SI  Percentage  wago  distortions  In  steeI.
d/  Change  in  employment  In  steel  in  thousands  of  work-years.- 17 -
Table  4
Effect of  *tE*  la  Autoes
(billions  of  1984  dollars)
----- Endogenous  Wage  Distortion  */----
No  Wag.  Exogenous  Wag*  Union  Wags  Union  Wage  Union  Wage
Distortion  Distortion  Weight  r.2  Weight  U.5  Weight  Z.$
1. Distortionary  Costs  of
VERo  k/
a.  CRTS  1.96  1.78  1.79  1.84  1.88
b.  Contectable  Markoto  0.91  0.82  0.85  0.98  1.08
c.  Monopolistic  Competition  J  1.63  (.952)  1.49  (.952)  1.48  (.954) 1.43  (.966)  1.38  (.977)
2. Capture  Rents  h/
a.  CRTS  7.87  7.8  7.86  7.67  7.87
b. Contestable  Markets  7.87  7.86  7.86  7.37  7.87
c.  Monopolistic  Competition  7.89  7.88  7.88  7.83  7.89
3.  Total  Benefits  of VER  Removal  b/
a.  CRTS  9.62  9.64  9.65  9.71  9.76
b. Contestablo  Markets  8.79  8.68  8.71  8.84  8.96
c. Monopolistic  Competition  9.62  9.U63  9.366  9.31  9.27
Wage  Premium  O/
a.  CRTS  0.0  0.27  0.28  0.21  0.16
b. Contostable  Markets  0.0  0.27  0.26  0.20  0.14
c.  Monopolistic  Competition  0.0  0.27  0.26  0.20  0.16
Change  In  Employmnt /
a. CRTS  -36.2  -36.2  -38.9  -21.2  -8.7
b.  Contestable  Markets  -21.7  -21.7  -20.2  -12.6  -6.1
c.  Vonopolistic  Competition  -19.5  -19.5  -18.3  -11.6  -4.9
Notes:
All  simulations  are  with  ondogenous  economywide  labor  supply.
*/ Weight  on  wagon  Is  given  by  7 and  in  all  cases  7 + 6 *  1.0.
b/ EV  meaoure  In  billions  of 1984  dollars. The  distortionary  cost  Is  calculated  as  the  difforenco
between the  total  costs  of  VERo  and  the rants.
_/  The number In  parentheses  is  the  proportion  of  firms  which  remain  in  the  industry  after  firm  exit
due to  VER removal.
J  Porcentage  wage  distortions  In  autos.
*/  Change in  employment In  autos  in  thousands  of  work-years.- 18  -
Now  consider  the  role  of  union  activity. Labor  demand  being  a derived
demand  schedule,  protection  displaces  to the  right  the  labor  demand  schedule.
The  more  waight  the  union  attaches  to  wages (and  the  less  weight  it attaches  to
employmenc)  the  larger  the  induced  increase  in  wage premium  and  the  lower  the
increase  in employment.  For  the  combination  (7  - 0.2;  6  - 0.8),  the  wage
premium  barely  increases  and  employment  rises  by almost  as  much  as  when the
wage  premium  is  exogenous. For  the  combination  (C  - 0.8,  6  - 0.2),  the  wage
premium  reaches  33 percent  and,  as  a result,  there  is  only  a small  increase  in
employment  of 5.9  thousand  work-years.  With a  high  weight  on  wages,  the
distortionary  costs  of protection  are  almost  as  high  as in the  absence  of  a
wage  premium. The  increased  wage  premium  raises  distortion  costs  in the
product  market. This  cost  must  be  weighed  against  the  improved  allocation  of
labor. With  a  high  weight  on  wages,  the  high  wage  premium  and small  labor
reallocation  results  in  an increase  in  product  market  distortions  which  almost
exceeds  the  benefits  of labor  reallocation.
Note  also  that  the  rent  costs  of the  VERs  are  sensitive  to the  weight
the  union  places  on  wages (both  under  CRTS  and  contestable  markets). This  is
because  when  VERs  are  imposed,  there  is  an increase  in demand  for  the  domestic
variety  of the  product  which  induces  domestic  firms  to  expand  output. As firms
expand  output,  however,  they  are  faced  with increased  wage demands  by the
union. Thus,  the  greater  the  weight  the  union  places  on  wages,  the  lower  the
elasticity  of output  supply  of the  domestic  industry,  and the  higher  the  rent
component  cost  of the  VERs.
The  impact  of relatively  inelastic  domestic  supply  on rents  is
illustrated  in figure  1,  where  the  subscript  o (1)  indicates  the  initial  (post
VER  imposition)  equilibrium.  Imports  and  domestic  steel  are  gross  substitutes
for  each  other  so that  an increase  in  the  price  of domestic  steel  increases  theFigure  1
Imp&ct  of  Domestic  Supply  glasticity  on  V  R*ents
Domestic  Steel 
Imported  Steel
ik-~  ~  ~  ~~J
Note:  Superscript  e (l)  denotes  elastic  (inelastic)  scenario.- 20 -
demand  for  imported  steel. When the  VER is imposed  on imported  steel,  the
increased  demand  for  the  domestic  variety  results  in a larger  increase  in the
price  of the  domestic  variety  of steel  the  more inelastic  is  domestic  supply.
A larger  domestic  price  increase,  in  turn,  induces  a larger  increase  in  the
price  of the  foreign  variety  of steel  and  a larger  rent  earned  on foreign
steel. Thus,  as a result  of the  impact  of the  wage  premium  on the  rent
component  of the  VER,  the  total  costs  of protection  under  CRTS  with a  high
weight  on  wages  exceed  the  estimate  in the  case  of no  wage premium.
Now  consider  the  effects  of  VER imposition  in  steel  with  contestable
markets. VER  imposition  results  in  increased  demand  for  domestic  steel  and
consequently  greater  exploitation  of economies  of scale. The  improvement  in
scale  efficiency  lowers  significantly  the  distortion  costs  of protection.  With
exogenous  wage  distortions,  the  second  best  effects  of superior  labor
reallocation  are  sufficient  to result  in efficiency  gains  (negative  distortion
costs)  of $45  million. It  is only  with the  high  weight  on  wages  that  the
distortion  costs  become  positive. Finally  because  the  rent  effect  also  depends
on the  wage  distortion  (see  figure  1),  the  total  costs  of VERs  exceed  the
corresponding  estimate  with  no  wage distortion  when the  weight  on  wages  is
high.
Autos. Here  the  estimates  of rents  are  virtually  invariant. This  is
because,  unlike  steel,  auto  VERs  existed  in the  base  year.  so  we remove  VERs
rather  than  impose  them  as in  steel. Since  all  models  are  calibrated  to  be
consistent  with  the  exogenous  estimates  of the  premia  rates  and  rents  that
existed  in  autos  in  1984,  results  differ  only  due  to the  distortion  costs  of
the  VERs.18/ Now  because  protection  is  removed,  the  reduction  in  the  derived
demand  for  labor  induces  a larger  reduction  in the  wage rate  the  higher  the
union's  weight  on  wages.  This  pattern  holds  across  all  market  structures.- 21 -
First  consider  CRTS  and  competition.  Moving  labor  out  of autos
represents  a second  best  loss,  and  consequently  lowers  the  estimated  value  of
the  benefits  of liberalization.  As before,  distortion  costs  increase  as the
weight  on  wages  increases  because  there  is  less  labor  reallocation.  Distortion
costs  remain  high in  all  cases.
With  contestable  markets,  removing  protection  results  in  a decrease  in
scale  efficiency,  and  hence  lower  benefits  of  protection  removal. Exogenous
wage  distortions  have  the  anticipated  second  best  effect. With endogenous  wage
distortions,  distortions  costs  can  exceed  those  in the  no  wage distortion  case.
As explained  above,  this  is  because  the  reduction  in the  derived  demand  for
labor  induces  a lower  wage demand  by the  union. The  lower  wage demand,  in
turn,  induces  an increase  in output,  which  reduces  distortions  in the  product
market.
Finally,  consider  monopolistic  competition.  First,  observe  that  the
distortion  costs  exceed  those  under  contestable  markets  in  all  cases. This  is
because  with  monopolistic  competition  there  is  exit  in response  to trade
liberalization,  so  greater  realization  of scale  efficiency  is  achieved  than
with  contestable  markets. Second,  contrary  to  all  other  cases,  the  distortion
costs  of protection  decrease,  the  greater  the  union's  weight  on  wages.  The
reason  is  the  following.  The  decrease  in the  derived  demand  for  labor  which
accompanies  trade  liberalization  induces  a relatively  large  wege  decrease  (with
high  union  weight  on  wages). This  wage decrease  lowers  costs  for  firms  which,
in  turn  retards  exit.  The  effect  of lesser  scale  efficiency  dominates  the
effect  of the  lesser  loss  from  reduced  labor  misallocation,  so that  the
benefits  of liberalization  are smaller  with a  high  union  we!_oht  on  wages.
How  robust  are  the  results  in tables  3  and  4?  To assess  how  sensitive
results  are  to changes  in the  key  wage  distortion  parameter,  we  have replicated- 22 -
all  the  simulations  with  a  high  and  low  estimate  of the  wage distortion,  while
leaving  the  value  of  all  other  parameters  unchanged. For  tht  high (low)
simulations,  we used  Krueger  and  Summers'  estimates  of the  wage  distortion  plus
(minus)  two  times  the  standard  error  of their  estimate  of the  wage  distortion.
After  rounding,  this  yields  wage  distortion  values  of 33 and  19  percent  in
steel  and  32  and  22  percent  in  autos. As expected,  the  second  best  effect  of
superior  labor  reallocation  is increased  (decreased)  with  higher  (lower)
assumed  wage  distortions.  The  change  in  the  estimated  welfare  cost  estimates
with increased  or decreased  wage distortions  is  always  less  than  $35  million  in
both  autos  and  steel. For  example,  with  CRTS in  autos  and  exogenous  wage
distortions,  the  estimated  distortion  costs  increase  (decrease)  from  $1.78
billion  to $1.81  ($1.75)  in the  high (low)  wage  distortion  case.  From  tables  3
and  4,  one  can  see  that  $35  million  is less  than  two  percent  of the
distortionary  costs  of the  auto  VERs,  and is  also  a small  percentage  of the
total  costs  of the  auto  or steel  VERs.  Since  the  distortion  costs  of steel
VERs  are  small  or  negative  in some  cases,  an additional  $25-35  billion  of
benefits  from  superior  labor  reallocation  in  the  high  wage distortion  case  is
important  in  percentage  terms. We conclude  that,  overall,  the  striking  result
is  that  even  with  high  wage distortions,  the  benefits  of labor  reallocation  are
small  relative  to the  costs  of  protection.191
5. The  Non-Optimality  of *Optimal'  Policies
We now  ask  what  are  the  gains  from  removing  the  wage premia  and  give
illustrative  calculations  of the  potential  benefits  from  applying  'optimal'
policies  to  counteract  the  distortions  that  arise  from  wage premia  and/or
market  imperfections  under  IRTS. Start  with  the  welfare  gain  of removing  the_ 23 -
wage premia  in  autos  and  steel  under  the  assumption  that  QRs  remain  in  autos
and  steel. The  gain  from  removing  the  wage  premia  in autos  (steel)  is $0.18
($0.70)  billion. The  gain  in  steel  is  greater  because  the  elasticity  of labor
demand  is greater  in  steel  than  in  autos. The  wage distortion  rates  and  number
of employees  are roughly  the  same  in  both  sectors,  but  steel  has  a  higher  share
of value  added  as  wages  and  a higher  elasticity  of substitution  of capital  for
labor.
Consider  now  the  use  of  wage subsidies  to  achieve  economies  of scale
and to  counteract  the  effects  of product  market  imperfections  when  there  are
IRTS  in  autos  and  steel. To isolate  the  effects  of IRTS,  all  simulations  start
from  a free  trade  undistorted  equilibrium.  The "optimal"  policy  then  consists
of  choosing  the  wage subsidy  rates  in  autos  and  steel  which  maximize  utility  of
the  representative  consumer. We solve  for  these  rates  numerically.  In the
case  where  both  industries  use  a contestable  markets  pricing  rule,  a  weifare
gain  of $1.045  billion  would  be achieved  by  wage subsidies  of 5  percent  in
steel  and  28 percent  in  autos.  (The  higher  wage subsidy  in autos  reflects  the
higher  cost-disadvantage  ratio  in  that  sector). If  more  realistically  one
assumes  that  the  auto  industry  is  characterized  by monopolistic  competition,
exploitation  of scale  economies  will be achieved  by firm  exit.  Then  the
optimal  wage  policy  is  a  wage tax  of 56  percent  which  reduces  by 5  percent  the
number  of firms  in the  auto  industry. Combined  with the  gains  of  a 5 percent
wage subsidy  in steel,  the  overall  welfare  gain  would  be $367  million. Thus,
the  optimal  wage policy  for  the  auto  industry  with IRTS  reverses  from  a subsidy
to  a tax  on labor  depending  on the  pricing  rule. This  is  analogous  to  the
Eaton-Grossman  result  mentioned  above.
Consider  next  applying  optimal  tariff  policy  in  the  presence  of  wage
distortions.  As before,  we start  from  an  undistorted  equilibrium,  except  that- -4  _
now  we include  wage premia  in  autos  and  steel. The  simulation  exercise
consists  of  maximizing  utility  using  tariffs  in  autos  and steel  as instruments.
As an illustration,  we report  the  results  of four  sets  of  optimal  tariff
calculations:  exogenous  wage distortions  with  CRTS  and IRTS,  and  endogenous
wage  distortions  and  high  union  weight  on  wages  under  CRTS  and IRTS. In the
case  of CRTS,  optimal  tariff  policy  in  both  sectors  with exogenous  wage premia
yields  tariff  rates  of 5 (1)  percent  in steel  (autos),  for  a total  we'fare  gain
of $4  million. With endogenous  wage  premia,  however,  with  a  high  weight  on
wages,  the  welfare  gain  is  almost  zero. The  same  pattern  of lower  benefits
with  endogenous  wage distortions  results  if  we assume  IRTS  with  contestable
markets  in  steel  and  monopolistic  competition  in  autos. The corresponding
magnitudes  are  $145  million  (with  10 (3)  percent  tariff  rates  in steel  (autos)]
with exogenous  wage  premia. With  endogenous  wage  premia  and  high  weight  on
wages  the  gains  are  reduced  to $7  million.20/
Due  to strategic  considerations,  however,  the  gains  from  these  optimal
wage subsidy  and  tariff  simulations  may  not  be  achievable.  Wage subsidies  to
these  industries  to reduce  distortions  would  be problematical  if,  as  we have
argued,  wage distortions  are  the  result  of union  activity. Unions  would  then
find  it to  their  advantage  to increase  wage  demands  resulting  in increased
government  costs  and  taxation  requirements  with offsetting  distortions.
Similarly,  the  optimal  tariff  calculations  are  subject  to the  criticism  that  if
the  union  believes  that  it can  increase  protection  by its  wage demands,  then
the  benefits  of optimal  tariffs  may  not  be achievable;  and,  of course,  the
optimal  tariff  would  be significantly  altered  by retaliation.21/- 25  -
Conclusions
At the  outset  of this  paper  we asked  whether  acknowledging  that  both
autos  and  steel  pay  among  the  highest  wage  premia  in  US manufacturing  would  be
sufficient  to justify  protection  for  these  sectors  based  on  wage premia.
Through  detailed  modelling  of the  labor  market  and  of its  interactions  with the
product  market,  we have  confirmed  that  the  traditional  costs  of  protection  are
mitigated  by the  presence  of  wage  premia. If the  wage premia  can  be considered
exogenous,  then  the  costs  of  protection  will be lower  than  in the  absence  of
wage  premia,  but  not  by  much  unless  the  wage  premia  interact  with scale
efficiency,  and  the  latter  is  an important  element  of the  product  market
structure.  More importantly,  we have  argued  that  the nore  realistic
representation  of autos  and  steel  is  one  in  which  unions  set  wages  facing  a
tradeoff  between  employment  and  the  wage  premium. Then  the  existence  of  wage
premia  are  likely  to exacerbate  the  total  costs  of protection  on  two  counts.
First,  if  protection  is  by a VER,  which  is  currently  a frequent  instrument  of
protection,  then  the  rent  loss  component  cost  can  be greater  than  if  there  is
no  wage  premium. Second,  if  unions  place  a relatively  high  weight  on  wages,
the  distortionary  costs  of  protection  can  be higher  than  if there  were  no  wage
premia. Our  conclusion  is  that,  generally,  the  evidence  does  not support  the
case  for  an industrial  policy  in  high  wage industries.  We also  rsked  what
would  be the  benefits  of "optimal"  wage  and  tariff  policy  in both  industries  to
counteract  prevailing  wage premia. With  endogenous  wage distortions,  our
calculations  suggest  extremely  small  welfare  gains  from  optimal  tariff  policy
if such  policies  could  be implemented  in  practice. Depending  on  market
structure,  the  optimal  wage policy  may  be a tax.- 26 -
Footnotes
1/  Several  "efficiency  wage"  theories,  based  on  differences  in technology
across  industries,  explain  these  wage  premia. Shapiro  and  Stiglitz  (1984)
suggest  that  in industries  where  shirking  is  difficult  or costly  to
detect,  it  may  be efficient  for  firms  to  pay  premium  wages.  Similarly,  an
industry  which  faces  relatively  high  costs  from  labor  turnover  will find
it  optimal  to  pay  premium  wages (Stiglitz,  1985;  Weiss,  1980). Akerlof
(1984)  argues  that  if  the  firm  is  perceived  as earning  rents,  productivity
may suffer  if  workers  do  not  also  receive  rents. A particularly  appealing
theory  is  developed  by Thaler  (1989)  who argues  that  it  may  be desirable
in some  industries  to  pay  high (nondistortionary)  wages  to  attract  highly
qualified  workers  in particular  skill  categories.  As a result,
productivity  of  workers  in  skill  categories  where  premia  are  not  desirable
to  the  firm  may  decline,  unless  they  also  receive  a premium  which  is
distortionary.
2/  Katz  and  Summers  are  careful  to  point  out that  the  case  for  an activist
industrial  policy  must  be tempered  by the  fact  that  it is  unlikely  to  be
applied  optimally  in  practice. Also see  section  5  below.
3/  As shown  in section  4, this  result  applies  in  the  case  of CRTS  or
contestable  markets,  but  is  modified  if  one  assumes  a monopolistically
competitive  market  structure  for  autos.
4/  In de  Melo  and  Tarr (1990b),  we show  that  although  steel  and  auto  workers
in other  countries  earn  a  premium  above  the  average  manufacturing  worker
in their  own  countries,  that  premium  is  much  greater  in  the  US.  Given  our
sample  of 17 countries  in the  case  of autos  and  12 countries  for  steel,
excluding  the  US,  we find  the  average  auto  worker  (steel  worker)  premium
is  16 (33)  percent.
5/  Since  observed  wage rates  of  homogenous  labor  differ  across  sectors,  our
calibration  of the  production  function  and  the  marginal  productivity  of
labor  is  equivalent  to  measuring  labor  in efficiency  units. We choose  Oi
for  autos  and  steel  to  be 1.27  and  1.26,  respectively,  rather  than  1.53
and  1.63,  which  are  wage  premia  unadjusted  for  productivity  differences.
6/  For  example,  deregulation  in  the  airline  and  trucking  industries  led  to a
considerable  reduction  in rents  captured  by the  unions  in these
industries.  See  Kahn (1980)  and  Levinson  (1980). More generally,  Freeman
and  Katz (1987)  have  found  enough  variation  in  changes  in  wages  across
industries  in response  to  demand  to trace  out  a "trade-  off"  curve  between
wages  and  employment.  They  find  that  wages  respond  more to sales  in
unionized  than  in  nonunionized  industries.
7/  The  union  might  accept  a "loww  wage in return  for  guarantees  by the  firm
that  it  would  employ  more  workers  than  given  by its  demand  curve. But
asymmetric  information  about  product  demand  shifts  (for  which  the  firm
must  be permitted  to  adjust  employment  or it  would  not  agree  to the
contract)  will allow  the  firm  to  cheat  on the  agreement.  Alternatively,
an incentive-compatible  contract  which  pays  the  union  a lump-sum  amount- 27 -
independent  of employment  in  return  for  a "low"  wage  will  present  problems
for  the  union  in  terms  of being  able  to allocate  the  lump-sum  payments  to
its  members.
8/  See  Oswald  (1982)  for  a  formulation  that  includes  leisure  in the
union's  utility  function.
9/  This  is in constrast  to Ballard  et al. (1985)  whose  own  elasticities
were all  unity  and  where  cross-substitution  effects  between  composite
commodities are  not  allowed. In addition,  our  formulation  allows
labor  supply  (including  the  parameter  MAXHOURS)  to be  written  in  terms
of  econometrically  estimated elasticities  rather than arbitrarily
assuming  a  value  for  MAXHOURS. Ballard  et al.  (1985),  who chose  the
latter  approach,  noted  that  their results  were  heavily dependent  on
assumed  value  for  MAXHOURS,  for  which  there  is little  data.
10/  Elasticity  estimates  draw  on Pencavel  (1986)  and  especially  Abbott  and
Ashenfelter  (1976)  for  males  and  Killingsworth  (1983),  Killingsworth  and
Heckman  (1986)  and  especially  Mroz (1987)  for  females.
11/  For  steel  we draw  on Tarr  (1984)  and for  autos  on  Winston  and  Associates
(1987)  and  Fr;edlander,  Winston  and  Wang (1983). The  corresponding  cost-
disadvantage  ratio  (CDR)  values  are  reported  in table  1.
12/ A natural  extension  is to recognize  that  conjectures  are  themselves
dependent  on the  number  of firms. Sensitivity  simulations  with this
extended  formulation  yield  slightly  larger  benefits  from  trade
liberalization  but  similar  results  for  the  pattern  of  wage distortions  and
are  available  from  the  authors  on request.
13/  We assume  there  are  three  auto  firms  initially  in  calibrating  conjectures.
Given  data  on  prices,  costs  and  elasticities  only  the ratio  of  0 to  N is
identified.  Thus,  an equivalent  approach  is  to read  in  Cournot
conjectures  and  calibrate  for  N, the  Cournot  equivalent  number  of firms.
This  is  the  approach  followed  by Dixit  (1988)  who  obtains  a  value  of N =
13.8  for  1983. Our  calibration  yields  a  value  of  N =  4.2,  indicating  a
less  competitive  industry  in 1984. An alternative  --  but in  our  view less
appealing  --  approach  is to solve  for  marginal  costs  or for  the  demand
values  for  0,  N and  the  zero  profit  condition. See  Devarajan  and  Rodrik
(1989)  for  another  example  along  the lines  followed  by Dixit.
14/  The  specification  of foreign  trade  is as in  de  Melo and  Robinson  (1989).
CES  and  CET formulations  were  developed  by Armington  (1969)  and  Powell  and
Gruen  (1968). The  assumption  of product  differentiation  between  domestic
and  export  sales  is of little  consequence  in  view  of the  low  export  shares
of the  auto  and  steel  industry. We choose  the  small  country  assumption.
For  an alternative  large  country  formulation,  see  de  Melo  and  Tarr
(1990a).- 28 -
15/ We-have  also  estimated  the  case  where  US auto  dealers  of Japanese  vehicles
captured  some  rents  above  the  premia  rate  of table  1.  The  costs  of the
VERs  in this  case  exceed  the  estimates  of table  2 by about  $1.3  billion
(see  de  Melo  and  Tarr,  1990a).
16/  This  implies  that  to obtain  the  joint  costs  of  VERs in  autos  and  steel  one
would  remove  the  VERs  from  a solution  where  steel  is rationed. Joint
estimates  are  not reported  here  since  the  values  are  only  very  marginally
less  than  the  sum  of the  individual  general  equilibrium  estimates.
17/  Sensitivity  analysis  to the  assumed  values  of demand  and supply
elasticities  with fixed  labor  supply  are reported  in  de  Melo and  Tarr
(1990a). As explained  there,  the  rent  component  is sensitive  to assumed
elasticities  only  in  the  steel  case. As to the  distortionary  cost
component,  when lov  (high)  elasticities  are  used,  the  cost  is $1.09
billion  ($2.96  billion)  for  autos  and  $0.27  billion  ($0.10  billion)  for
steel. The  asymmetry  with respect  to  variation  in  elasticities  comes  from
the  fact  that  quota  imposition  in  steel  results  in  a larger  price  change
the  lower  the  set  of elasticities.  Quota  removal  in  autos,  however,  is
necessarily  treated  as the  removal  of the  tariff  equivalent  of the  quota
and  results  in a  greater  quantity  change  the  greater  the  elasticities.
See  de  Melo and  Tarr (1990b).
18/  Estimates  of the  benefits  of  capturing  rents  differ  very slightly  due  to
the  fact  the  estimates  depend  on the  income  elasticity  of demand  for  autos
which  is  endogenous.
19/  A similar  pattern  of results  occurs  when  wage distortions  are  endogenous.
A  complete  set  of sensitivity  results  are  in  an appendix  available  from
the  authors  on request.
20/  Our  CRTS simulations  are  consistent  with those  of Dixit  (1988). Dixit
assumed  CRTS  and  fixed  input-output  coefficients  for  labor  and  capital.
He found  a subsidy  to  the  production  of autos  (which  is  equivalent  to a
wage subsidy  with fixed  coefficients)  is  a superior  instrument  to a
tariff.
21/  See  Fernandez  (1989)  for  a  discussion  of  other  strategic  issues  that  make
the  achievement  of  benefits  from  optimal  policies  in response  to labor
market  distortions  problematical.'  - 29-
References
Abbott,  H.,  and  0.  Ashenfelter.  1976.  'Labour  supply,  commodity  demand  and
the  allocation  of  time."  Review  of Economic  Studies  43(3):
389-411.
Akerlof,  G. 1984.  'Gift  Exchange  and  Efficiency  --  Wage  Theory: Four
Views." American  Economic  Review,  Papers  proceedings,  74:  79-83.
Armington,  P. 1969.  "A  theory  of demand  for  products  distinguished  by
place  of production."  IMF  Staff  Papers  no. 16:  159-178.
International  Monetary  Fund:  Washington,  D.C.
Ballard,  C.,  D. Fullerton,  J. Shoven  and  J. Whalley.  1985.  A general
equilibrium  model  for  tax  policy  evaluation.  Chicago:  University
of  Chicago  Press  for  NBER.
Bhagwati,  J.  1971.  'The  Generalized  Theory  of Distortions  and  Welfare"  in
J. Bhagwati  et  al. (eds.) Trade,  Balance  of  Payments  and  Growth.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Brander,  J.A.,  and  B.J.  Spencer.  1983.  "International  R &  D rivalry  and
industrial  strategy.'  Review  of  Economic  Studies  50:  707-722.
Brander,  J.A.,  and  B.J.  Spencer.  1984.  "Tariff  protection  and  imperfect
competition."  In  H. Kierkowski,  ed.,  Monopolistic  competition  and
international  trade.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press.
Bulow,  J. and  L. Summers.  1986.  "A  Theory  of  Dual  Labor  Markets,  with
Application  to  Industrial  Policy,  Discrimination  and  Keynesian
Unemployment."  Journal  of Labor  Economics  Y:  376-414.
Cox,  D.,  and  R. Harris.  1985.  "Trade  liberalization  and  industrial
organization:  some  estimates  for  Canada."  Journal  of Political
Economy  93:  115-45.
Deaton,  A.,  and  J. Muellbauer.  1980.  Economics  and  consumer  behavior.
Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press.
Devarajan,  S.,  and  D. Rodrik.  1989.  'Pro-competitive  effects  of  trade
reform:  results  from  a CGE  model  for  Cameroon."  Cambridge:  Harvard
University.  Mimeo.
Dinopoulos,  E.,  and  M. Kreinin.  1988.  "Effects  of the  US-Japan  auto  VER  on
European  prices  and  US  welfare."  Review  of  Economics  and
Statistics.
Dixit,  A. 1988.  "Optimal  trade  and  industrial  policies  for  the  US
automobile  industry."  In  R. Feenstra,  ed.,  Empirical  methods  in
international  trade.  Cambridge:  MIT Press.
Dixit,  A.,  and  J. Stiglitz.  1977.  "Monopolistic  competition  and  optimum
product  diversity.'  American  Economic  Review  67:  297-308.- 30 -
Eaton,  J.,  and  G. Grossman.  1986.  "Optimal  trade  and  industrial  policy
under  oligopoly."  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics  101:  383-406.
Farber,  H. 1986.  "The  analysis  of  union  behavior." In  0. Ashenfelter  and
R. Layard,  eds.,  Handbook  of labor  economics,  vol. II. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Feenstra,  R. 1988.  "Quality  change  under  trade  restraints:  theory  and
evidence  from  Japanese  autos."  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics  102:
131-46.
Fernandez,  R. 1989.  "Comment."  (On  Katz  and  Summers). In  R. Feenstra,  ed.,
Trade  policies  for  international  competitiveness.  Chicago:
University  of  Chicago  Press.
Freeman,  R.,  and  L. Katz.  1987.  "Industrial  wage  and  employment
determination  in  an open  economy." Paper  presented  at  National
Bureau  of Economic  Research  Conference  on Immigration,  Trade,  and
Labor,  Sept.  11-12,  mimeo.
Friedlander,  A.,  C.  Winston,  and  K. Wang.  1984.  "Costs,  technology,  and
productivity  in the  US automobile  industry."  Bell  Journal  of
Economics  14:  1-20.
Harris,  R. 1984.  "Applied  general  equilibrium  analysis  of small  open
economies  with scale  economies  and  imperfect  competition."
American  Economic  Review  74:  1016-1032.
Kahn,  M. 1980.  "Airlines."  In  G. Somers,  ed.,  Collective  bargaining:
contemporary  American  experience.  Wisconsin:  Industrial  Relations
Research  Association.
Katz,  L.,  and  L. Summers.  1989a.  "Can  interindustry  wage differentials
justify  strategic  trade  policy?"  In  R. Feenstra,  ed.,  Trade
policies  for  international  competitiveness.  Chicago:  University  of
Chicago  Press.
Katz,  L.,  and  L. Summers.  1989b.  "Industry  rents:  evidence  and
implications."  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity:
Microeconomics  (209-90).
Killingsworth,  M. 1983.  Labor  supply.  New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press.
Killingsworth,  M., and  J. Heckman.  1986.  "Female  labor  supply:  a survey."
In  0. Ashenfelter  and  R.  Layard,  eds.,  Handbook  of labor
economics,  vol. I.  New  York:  Elsevier  Science  Publishers.
Krueger  A.,  and  L. Summers.  1988.  "Efficiency  wages  and  the  interindustry
wage structure."  Econometrica  56:  259-93.
Levinson,  H. 1980.  'Trucking."  In  G. Somers,  ed.,  Collective  bargaining:
contemporary  American  enterprise.  Wisconsin:  Industrial  Relations
Research  Association.-31  -
Mancke,  R. 1968.  "The  determinants  of steel  prices  hi  the  US:  1947-65."
Journal  of Industrial  Economics,  147-160.
McDonald,  I.M.,  and  R.M.  Solow.  1981.  "Wage  bargaining  and  employment."
American  Economic  Review  71:  896-908.
Melo,  J. de,  and  D. Tarr. 1990a. "Welfare  Costs  of  US Quotas  in  Textiles,
Steel  and  Autos"  Review  of Economics  and  Statistics.
Melo,  J. de,  and  Tarr,  D. 1990b. A General  Equilibrium  Analysis  of Foreign
Trade  Policy. Washington,  D.C.:  World  Bank,  mimeo.
Melo,  J. de,  and  S.  Robinson.  1989.  "Product  differentiation  and  the
treatment  of foreign  trade  in  computable  general  equilibrium
models  of small  economies."  Journal  of International  Economics  27:
47-67.
Mroz,  T. 1987.  "The  sensitivity  of an empirical  model  of  married  women's
hours  of  work to  economic  and  statistical  assumptions."
Econometrica  55:  765-99.
Oswald,  A. 1982.  "The  microeconomic  theory  of the  trade  union."  Economic
Journal  92:  576-596.
Pencavel,  J. 1986.  "Labor  supply  of  men:  a survey."  In  0. Ashenfelter  and
R. Layard,  eds.,  Handbook  of labor  economics,  vol. I.  New  York:
Elsevier  Science  Publishers.
Powell,  A.,  and  F.  Gruen.  1968.  "The  constant  elasticity  of transformation
production  frontier  and  linear  supply  system."  International
Economic  Review  9.
Rippe.  R. 1970.  "Wages,  prices,  and  imports  in  the  American  steel
industry."  Review  of Economics  and  Statistics  47:  34-46.
Scherer,  F.M.  1980.  Industrial  market  structure  and  economic  performance.
Boston:  Rand  McNally.
Shapiro,  C.,  and  J. Stiglitz.  1984.  "Equilibrium  unemployment  as a  worker
discipline  device."  American  Economic  Review  74:  433-444.
Stiglitz,  J. 1985.  "Equilibrium  wage  distribution."  Fronomic  Journal  95:
595-618.
Tarr,  D. 1984.  "The  minimum  efficient  size  steel  plant."  The  Atlantic
Economic  Journal.
Tarr,  D. 1990.  "Steel:  international  position  and  mobilization
capabilities."  In  D. Losman  and  S.  Liang,  The  promise  of  American
industry.  New  York:  Quorum  Books.
Thaler,  R.H.  1989.  "Anomalies:  interindustry  wage differentials."  Journal
of Economic  Perspectives  3:  181-193.''  - 32 -
US Federal  Trade  Commission  Staff  Report.  1977.  "The  United  States  steel
industry  and  its  international  rivals, by D. Tarr  and  others.
Washington,  D.C.:  US Government  Printing  Office.
Weiss,  A. 1980.  'Job  queues  and  layoffs  in labor  markets  with flexible
wages.0  Journal  of Political  Economy  88:  526-538.
Winston,  C.,  and  Associates.  1987.  Blind  intersection?  Policy  and  the
automobile  industry.  Washington,  D.C.:  Brookings  Institution.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
DA  Autho  au  for oaper
WPS510  Public  Expenditure  Reviews  for  Antoine  Schwartz  October  1990  C. Cristobal
Education:  The Bank's  Experience  Gail Stevenson  33640
WPS511 The  Macroeconomic  Underpinnings  Fred  Jaspersen  October  1990  A. Oropesa
of Adjustment  Lending  Karim  Shariff  39075
WPS512  Social  Security  Reform:  The  Capital  Patricio  Arrau  October  1990  S. King-Watson
Accumulation  and Intergenerational  31047
Distribution  Effect
WPS513 The Business  Cycle Associated  with  Miguel  A. Kiguel  October  1990  E. Khine
Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  Nissan  Liviatan  39361
WPS514  Restrictive  Labor  Practices  in  Alan  S. Harding  October  1990  A. Joseph
Seaports  33743
WPS515  Stock  Markets  in Developing  Mansoor  Dailami  October  1990  M. Raggambi
Countries:  Key Issues  and  a  Michael  Atkin  37657
Research  Agenda
WPS516  International  Capital  Mobility  and  the  Jaime  de Melo  October  1990  S. Fallon
Costs  of U.S.  Import  Restraints  David  Roland-Holst  37947
WPS517  Do  Wage Distortions  Justify  Jaime  de Melo  October  1990  S.  Fallon
Protection in  the U.S.  Auto  and  David  Tarr  37947
Steel Industries?
WPS518  Industrial  Organization  and  Trade  Jaime  de Melo  October  1990  S. Fallon
Liberalization: Evidence  from Korea  David  Roland-Holst  37947